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Abstract. Detecting Zero-Day intrusions has been the goal of Cyber-
security, especially intrusion detection for a long time. Machine learning
is believed to be the promising methodology to solve that problem, nu-
merous models have been proposed but a practical solution is still yet
to come, mainly due to the limitation caused by the out-of-date open
datasets available. In this paper, we take a deep inspection of the flow-
based statistical data generated by CICFlowMeter, with six most popular
machine learning classification models for Zero-Day attacks detection.
The training dataset CIC-AWS-2018 Dataset contains fourteen types of
intrusions, while the testing datasets contains eight different types of at-
tacks. The six classification models are evaluated and cross validated on
CIC-AWS-2018 Dataset for their accuracy in terms of precision, recall,
F1 value, and time overhead. Testing dataset, including eight novel (or
Zero-Day) real-life attacks and benign traffic flows collected in real re-
search production network are used to test the performance of the chosen
decision tree classifier. Promising results are received with the accuracy
as high as 100% and reasonable time overhead. We argue that with the
statistical data collected from CICFlowMeter, simple machine learning
models such as the decision tree classification could be able to take charge
in detecting Zero-Day attacks.
Keywords: Intrusion detection, Zero-Day attacks, CIC-AWS-2018 dataset,
cybersecurity, machine learning, decision tree classifier
1 Introduction
With the novel cyber attacks keep emerging, and the rapid extension of new
communication protocols, which encrypts not only the user payload data but also
scrambles the packet header information such as IP address and Port number
[1], traditional intrusion detection methodologies which relays on finding and
matching the patterns of packets headers information (especially IP address and
Port number) are gradually losing their effectiveness. Thus adopting machine
learning technologies to detect intrusions are more and more believed to be
the future solution for intrusion detection [2–8]. As a technology of Artificial
Intelligence, machine learning is well known by its capability to grasp hidden
patterns from massive datasets and provide accurate prediction.
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2 Zhou et al.
The performance of a machine learning algorithm is largely depends on the
dataset it is trained on [2]. The majority of current machine learning based
intrusion detection approaches are trained with DARPA 98/991, KDD CUP 992
datasets. However, the use of these datasets has become a serious issue and an
increasing number of researchers recommend against their use [2, 8–12]. The
CSE-CIC-IDS 2018 dataset3 collected on one of Amazons´ AWS LAN network
(thus also known as the CIC-AWS-2018 Dataset ) by the Canadian Institute
of Cybersecurity (CIC) has gaining attention [13]. Besides the straightforward
TCP/IP level traffic information such as IP address and port number, CIC-AWS
datasets provides statistical traffic information based on flow, calculated by the
network flow generator and analyser developed by CIC – CICFlowMeter.
There are six different intrusion scenarios in the dataset, Brute-force, Bot-
net, DoS, DDoS, Web attacks, and infiltration of the network from inside, with
a total of 14 types of intrusions, namely, Botnet attack, FTP-BruteForce, SSH-
BruteForce, BruteForce-Web, BruteForce-XSS, SQL Injection, DDoS-HOIC at-
tack, DDoS-LOIC-UDP attack, DDoS-LOIC-HTTP attacks, Infiltration, DoS-
Hulk attack, DoS-SlowHTTPTest attack, DoS-GoldenEye attack, and DoS-Slowloris
attack. All the data are fully labeled, describing the statistical features of the
traffic, e.g., flow duration, number of packets, number of times a certain flag
was set in packets, total bytes used for the header in an upward flow, etc. The
raw record of network traffic and event logs are also provided in CIC-AWS-2018
Dataset , although they are not discussed in this paper.
Although the intrusion detection studies using CIC-AWS-2018 Dataset has
not yet been much reported, there are plenty research work has been done on
an earlier version of CIC-AWS-2018 Dataset , CICIDS2017 [13–15]. Radford
et.al [14] has applied unsupervised learning on CICIDS2017. The creator of CI-
CIDS2017 dataset, Sharafaldin et.al from the CIC institute use RandomFore-
stRegression to choose the top four features that can best describe each attacks,
and apply machine learning based intrusion detection for them [13].
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides detailed introduction of
the datasets used in this paper, including the CIC-AWS-2018 Dataset which is
the training dataset, and the Zero-Day intrusions collected online and benign
data collected in real research production environment. The procedure of data
laundry adopted in this paper is also presented. Section 3 describes the machine
learning methodology adopted in this paper. The evaluation experiments and the
results are analysed in detail in Section 4, including the cross validation process
and results, and the testing results. Finally, Section 5 summaries the paper and
provides our vision for future work.
1 https://www.ll.mit.edu/r-d/datasets
2 http://kdd.ics.uci.edu/databases/kddcup99/kddcup99.html
3 https://registry.opendata.aws/cse-cic-ids2018/
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2 Dataset
2.1 Training Dataset: CIC-AWS-2018 Dataset
The features in CIC-AWS dataset are described in Table 1. There are 80 features
in the dataset, providing statistical information of the flows from both uplink
and downlink. Comparing to the straightforward TCP/IP traffic header infor-
mations provided by the previous datasets, like DARPA and KDD, it is widely
believed that the statistics based on flow could provide more useful information
for intrusion detection [16].
In order to get a general idea of the dataset, we plot a bar chart of each fea-
ture against the label. As redundant features will increase computation expense,
induce chaos and reduce accuracy, we delete the features that does not show any
difference between benign traffic and malicious one.
2.2 Test Dataset
We use real life traffic data as the source of test dataset. The test datasets are
collected from mainly two different sources, the benign data and intrusion data.
Benign test data Benign data are collected from our real-life online surfing
traffic collected from a typical research product network, it generated during the
following daily online activities: emailing, searching (mainly on Google), reading
news, watching video (through Netflex and Youtube), downloading paper from
Google Scholar.
The data are collected for a week on our office desktop in a research daily
routine environment, and then converted into flow-based statistical dataset con-
sisting of 12,681 MB.
Intrusion test data To evaluate the ability of the machine learning models in
detecting an attack that it has not seen before (or in other word, Zero-Day at-
tacks), we collect novel real-life attacks traffic data containing eight new attack
types with no repetitive with the training CIC-AWS-2018 Dataset . The attack
types in the test data are listed in Table 2. This dataset is collected from most
recent real life attacks or abnormal traffic that humans failed to detect and pre-
vent, most of them are still active till nowadays, such as ransom malware, DDoS
Bot?a Darkness, Google doc macadocs, and Bitcoin Miner(this is more like
abnormal traffic rather than intrusions to many people).
2.3 Data Laundry
The following steps are adopted to laundry the CIC-AWS-2018 Dataset .
– Delete noisey features;
– Format data into standard datatype;
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– To reduce the size of the datasets, reduce the unnecessary accuracy of the
float numbers by dropping digits after the decimal point;
– Replace noisy, machine unprocessable chars by underline ;
– Replace “Infinity” and “NaN” value with suitable numbers.
After the laundry, the total size of training dataset has dropped from 6,886
MB to 4 MB, without losing valuable information.
Title Suppressed Due to Excessive Length 5
Table 1. Features Used in CIC-AWS Dataset
Feature Description Type
Label indicate whether the traffic is ma-
licious or not, e.g., benign, SQL-
Injection, etc.
string
Dst Port Destination port number integer
Protocol Protocol integer
TimeStamp Time Stamp of the flow string
Flow Duration Flow duration integer
Tot Fwd/Bwd Pkts Total packets in forward/backward di-
rections
integer
TotLen Fwd/Bwd Pkts Total size of packets in forward/back-
ward directions
integer
Fwd/Bwd Pkt Len
Max/Min/Mean/Std
Maxi/Mini/Average/Std. Dev. size of
package in forward/backward direc-
tions
integer
Flow Byts/s & Flow Pkts/s Flow byte rate, i.e., number of packets
per seconds
float64
Flow IAT Mean/Std/ Max/Min Average/Std. Deviation/Maxi/Mini
time between two flows
float64
Fwd/Bwd IAT Tot/Mean/ Std/-
Max/Min
Total/Average/Std. Deviation/Max-
i/Mini time between two packets in
forward/backward directions
float64
Fwd/Bwd PSH/URG Flags Number of times the PSH/URG flag
was set in packets in forward/back-
ward direction
integer
Fwd/Bwd Header Len Total bytes used for header in for-
ward/backward direction
integer
Fwd/Bwd Pkts/s Number of forward/backward packets
per second
float64
Pkt Len Min/Max/Mean/Std Maxi/Mini/Average/Std. Dev. length
of a flow
integer
Pkt Len Var Mini inter-arrival time of packet float64
FIN/SYN/RST/PUSH/ACK/
URG/CWE/ECE Flag Cnt
Number of packets with
FIN/SYN/RST/PUSH/ACK-
/URG/CWE/ECE
integer
Down/Up Ratio Download/upload ratio integer
Pkt Size Avg Average size of packets in for-
ward/backward direction
float64
Fwd/Bwd Seg Size/Byts/b/Blk Rate
Avg
Average number of bulk rate/bytes
bulk rate/packets bulk rate in for-
ward/backward directions
float64
Subflow Fwd/Bwd Pkts/Byts The average number of bytes/packets
in a sub flow in forward/backward di-
rection
integer
Init Fwd/Bwd Win Byts Number of bytes sent in initial window
in forward/backward directions
integer
Fwd Act Data Pkts Number of packets with at least 1 byte
of TCP data payload in forward
integer
Fwd Seg Size Min Minimum segment size observed in for-
ward
integer
Active Mean/Std/Max/Min Maxi/Mini/Average/Std. Dev. a flow
was active before becoming idle
float64
Idle Mean/Std/Max/Min Maxi/Mini/Average/Std. Dev. a flow
was idle before becoming active
float64
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Table 2. Attack Types included in Test Dataset
Attack Type Description
Bitcoin Miner Traffic generated during Bitcoin mining, maybe not a typ-
ical attack, but is treated as traffic blocker in production
network.
Drowor worm A virus in Windows operation system that infects portable
executable (PE) files, such as those with EXE, DLL, and
SYS files. It stops security processes from running, and
overwrites some of their code, which means that you may
have to reinstall affected security programs4.
Nuclear ransomware A new version of file-encrypting virus that actively spreads
in Hungary, Italy, and Iran. Crypto-malware uses a combi-
nation of RSA and AES encryption and appends .[black.
world@tuta.io].nuclear extension. Criminals provide a
ransom note in HELP.hta file and ask to contact black.
world@tuta.io for more information.
False content injection Some network operators inject false content into users’
network traffic, the injected packets have identical IP ad-
dress, port number, and TCP sequence numbers, but dif-
ferent payload.
Ponmocup trojan A trojan in Windows operation system, which tries to
download other malware from the Internet.
DDoS Bot’a Darkness Containing four types of DDoS attacks, namely HTTP
flood, ICMP flood, ping, SYN flood and UDP flood. Still
under active development by Russian malware coders.
Google doc macadocs A new variant of the Macadocs malware to be using
Google docs as a proxy server and not connecting to a
command and control (C&C) server directly.
ZeroAccess A Trojan horse computer malware that affects Microsoft
Windows operating systems. It is used to download other
malware on an infected machine from a botnet while re-
maining hidden using rootkit techniques.
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3 Machine Learning Classifiers
In our problem model, the task is that given a set of statistic information of
a flow, identify whether this flow is benign traffic or intrusion, based learning
on a set of already labelled data containing both benign and intrusion traffic,
that makes our problem a supervised classification problem. To find the best
classification model that suit into our problem, we run a exhaustive test of the
six most commonly used machine learning classification models on the training
dataset, comparing their performance using the criterias of precision, recall, F1
score, and time expense.
The supervised machine learning classification models tested are listed below.
– Random forest classifier
– Gaussian naive bayes classifier
– Decision tree classifier
– Multi-layer Perceptron (MLP) classifier
– K-nearest neighbours classifier
– Quadratic discriminant analysis classifier
The performance of each classification model will be analysed in detail during
the cross validation process in Section 4.2.
4 Evaluation
This section presents the evaluation experiments setup and the evaluation results
of intrusion detections. The evaluation experiments includes: 1) cross validation
of the training CIC-AWS-2018 Dataset on each of the attack types, and 2) the
prediction using testing data on the model chosen.
4.1 Environment
The software tool used in the evaluation experiments is sklearn5, numpy6, and
pandas7. All the evaluation experiments are carried on a Dell server working at
3.4 GHz on 8 cores AMD64 CPU, with 16 GB memory and 1 TB hardware disk.
4.2 Cross Validation Results
To test the fitness of each machine learning classification models in prediction,
we run a cross validation on each of the fourteen types of attacks in the training
CIC-AWS-2018 Dataset , and the results are shown in detail in Table 3, 4 , 5,
6, 7, 8, 9, 10 , 11, 12, and 13.
5 https://scikit-learn.org/
6 https://www.numpy.org/
7 https://pandas.pydata.org/
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Table 3. Machine Learning Results of Botnet Attack on Different Classification Mod-
els.
Random Forest Naive Bayes Decision Tree Neural Network (MLP) Quadratic Discriminante KNeighbors
True-Positive 98% 52% 100% 100% 100% 100%
False-Positive 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
recall
Benigh 1.00 0.65 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Bot 1.00 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
f1-score
Benigh 1.00 0.79 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Bot 0.99 0.68 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Table 4. Machine Learning Results of FTP-BruteForce Attack on Different Classifi-
cation Models.
Random Forest Naive Bayes Decision Tree Neural Network (MLP) Quadratic Discriminante KNeighbors
True-Positive 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% –
False-Positive 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% –
recall
Benigh 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 –
FTP-BruteForce 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 –
f1-score
Benigh 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 –
FTP-BruteForce 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 –
The intrusion detection performance of each classification model is illustrated
in terms of true-positive rate (Fig 1), false-positive rate (Fig 2) and time expense
(Fig 3). The true-positive rate is the rate of the intrusion detected against all the
intrusions happened, while false-positive rate is the rate of normal traffic been
mistaken by the model as intrusions against all the normal traffics.
In Fig 1, x-axis denotes the true-positive rate, while the y-axis lists all
types of intrusions recorded in the training dataset. The results of different ma-
chine learning classification models are denoted by different colours. As shown
in Fig 1, different intrusions types illustrated different patterns in the traffic,
some can be easily detected by all the classification models tested, such as
DoS-SlowHTTPTest, DoS-Hulk, DDoS-LOIC-UDP, DDoS-HOIC, FTP-BruteForce.
In other word, the traffic generated by these intrusions illustrated more distinct
characters or patterns comparing to normal traffic. Some intrusions, however,
shown more subtle differences. For example, for the intrusions SQL Injection,
and BruteForce-Web, only one classification model decision tree classifier
can provide a true-positive rate higher than 96%. The most difficult to detect
intrusion is the Infilteration, where almost all the classification models can
have a true-positive rate less than 30%, except decision tree classifier,
which gets almost 90%. To summarise, there is only one classification model
perform well in all the intrusion types, the decision tree classifier, which
is denoted by the pale green bars in Fig 1. Actually, as shown in Tables 3 – 13,
the accuracy of decision tree classification is straight 100%, except for
Infilteration, which still performs better than the other models.
The false-positive rate is illustrated in Fig 2. The x-axis is the false-positive
rate ranging from 0.00% to 20.00%, and the y-axis lists all types of intrusions in
the training set. The false-positive rate is indicator of great significance in intru-
sion detection system, even more important than true-positive rate, for in real
Title Suppressed Due to Excessive Length 9
Table 5. Machine Learning Results of SSH-BruteForce Attack on Different Classifica-
tion Models
Random Forest Naive Bayes Decision Tree Neural Network (MLP) Quadratic Discriminante KNeighbors
True-Positive 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% –
False-Positive 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% –
recall
Benigh 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 –
SSH-BruteForce 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 –
f1-score
Benigh 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 –
SSH-BruteForce 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 –
Table 6. Machine Learning Results of BruteForce-Web Attack on Different Classifi-
cation Models.
Random Forest Naive Bayes Decision Tree Neural Network (MLP) Quadratic Discriminante KNeighbors
True-Positive 0% 0% 96% 0% 100% 96%
False-Positive 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
recall
Benigh 0.21 0.21 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
BruteForce-Web 0.0 0.0 0.46 0.0 0.66 0.90
f1-score
Benigh 0.35 0.35 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
BruteForce-Web 0.0 0.0 0.62 0.0 0.8 0.93
life, if an intrusion detection system generate too many false-positives, the alarms
will not be taken seriously or even shut down by human users, which would
cause greater danger than low true-positive rate. As shown in Fig 2, for most
of the intrusions (more specifically, any intrusions other than Infilteration),
false-positive rate generated by all the common machine learning classification
models are as low as 0%, except for Infilteration, which experiences between
10.00% ∼ 17.00%.
The overhead in terms of time expense is illustrated in Fig 3 to demonstrate
the efficiency of each machine learning classification models. The model that per-
forms best in accuracy, decision tree classification, also cause less time
than the peer classification models, consuming less than 20 seconds on all attack
types.
As analysed above, in the cross validation experiment, the decision tree
classification fitted best among the six common classifier models, consuming
less time. Thus, we choose it as the training model for the intrusion detection of
testing data, as discussed in the following section.
4.3 Test Results
Our goal is to detect intrusions with the accuracy in terms of false-positive rate
and true-positive rate as high as possible, especially when the intrusions has not
been seen before (in other words Zero-Day attacks), we normalised the intrusion
types in train CIC-AWS-2018 Dataset and test datasets into one unique type
“Evil”. Thus there are only two types of traffic in the datasets, “Benign” and
“Evil”. The goal is to detect “Evil” traffic, especially Zero-Day attacks, with
the highest possible accuracy, no matter what type of intrusion it is. The ability
of identifying the exact types of detected intrusions is also highly desirable, but
10 Zhou et al.
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Fig. 1. The True-Positive rate for different classification models on different attack
types.
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Fig. 2. The False-Positive rate for different classification models on different attack
types.
Fig. 3. The machine learning time consumption for different attack types.
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Table 7. Machine Learning Results of BruteForce-XSS Attack on Different Classifi-
cation Models.
Random Forest Naive Bayes Decision Tree Neural Network (MLP) Quadratic Discriminante KNeighbors
True-Positive 0% 0% 100% 14% 83% 94%
False-Positive 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
recall
Benigh 0.21 0.21 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
BruteForce-XSS 0.0 1.0 0.50 0.31 0.94 0.94
f1-score
Benigh 0.35 0.35 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
BruteForce-XSS 0.0 0.0 0.67 0.19 0.88 0.94
Table 8. Machine Learning Results of SQL Injection Attack on Different Classification
Models.
Random Forest Naive Bayes Decision Tree Neural Network (MLP) Quadratic Discriminante KNeighbors
True-Positive 0% 0% 100% 5% 32% 50%
False-Positive 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
recall
Benigh 0.21 0.21 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
SQL Injection 0.0 0.43 0.71 0.29 1.0 0.43
f1-score
Benigh 0.35 0.35 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
SQL Injection 0.0 0.0 0.83 0.09 0.48 0.46
we focus on detecting intrusions only in this paper and will leave it as future
work, thus will not discuss it here.
We evaluate the test datasets on the chosen decision tree classification
model in three steps: 1) test on “Benign” test data only; 2) test on “Evil” test
data only; 3) test on the combined and shuffled benign and intrusion test dataset,
with different max depth of the decision tree.
The test results of steps 1) and 2) are shown in Table 14. As shown in the
bold numbers, the model is able to detect the tested “Evil” and “Benign” data
with 100% accuracy. For there is no “Benign” data in the “Evil data only” test,
and no “Evil” data in the “Benign data only” test, the obvious “0.00%” precision
of corresponding data are got.
At step 3), we merge and shuffle the intrusion test data with the Zero-
Day intrusions (comparing to training data) listed in Table 2 into the benign
dataset. The depth of a decision tree is the length of the longest path from root
to a leaf, it determined the size of the tree and affect the performance of the
tree models. To find the best size of the decision tree, we fit the test datasets
into a couple of decision tree classifiers with the maximum depth of 2, 3, 4, 5,
and 6. The detection efficiency is evaluated in terms of false-positive rate and
true-positive rate in Fig 4, and the time expenses of different tree models are also
given in Fig 5. In Fig 4, the x-axis denotes the maximum depth of the different
decision tree classifiers, and the y-axis denotes the percentage rates. The
true-positive rate is denoted with orange solid bars in every model, while the
false-positive rate is denoted with striped black bars. As shown in Fig 4, the
true-positive rate achieves the best at 96% when the maximum depth is 5, and
slightly deteriorates to 92% and 90% when the maximum depth reduces to 3 and
4. The false-positive rate gets its lowest at 5% when the maximum depth are 3
and 4, and deteriorates to about 10% when the maximum depth gets either lower
or higher to 2 or 5. In summary, the intrusion detector performs best with the
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Table 9. Machine Learning Results of DDoS-HOIC Attack on Different Classification
Models.
Random Forest Naive Bayes Decision Tree Neural Network (MLP) Quadratic Discriminante KNeighbors
True-Positive 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
False-Positive 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
recall
Benigh 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
DDoS-HOIC 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
f1-score
Benigh 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
DDoS-HOIC 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Table 10. Machine Learning Results of DDOS-LOIC-UDP Attack on Different Clas-
sification Models.
Random Forest Naive Bayes Decision Tree Neural Network (MLP) Quadratic Discriminante KNeighbors
True-Positive 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
False-Positive 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
recall
Benigh 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
DDOS-LOIC-UDP 1.0 0.66 1.0 0.93 0.66 0.69
f1-score
Benigh 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
DDOS-LOIC-UDP 1.0 0.80 1.0 0.97 0.80 0.81
tree depth at 3, 4, and 5, either increase or decrease the maximum depth will
deteriorate the performance. Further experiments will be carried out to find the
better model to fit the flow-based statistical data for intrusion detection, but
will be discussed somewhere else.
The time expenses of the decision tree classifiers with different maximum
depth are shown in Fig 5, in terms of real (striped blue bars), sys (doted orange
bars), and user (solid green bars) time in seconds. As obviously shown in the
trending line of real time (which is the totally consumed time), the time expense
grows exponentially with the maximum depth. This is predictable for the size of
the decision tree classifier is 2d+1 − 1, where d is the depth of the tree, and the
calculation time expense is positively related to the size of the decision tree.
0% 
20% 
40% 
60% 
80% 
100% 
2 3 4 5 6
Max	Depth
True-Positive	Rate False-Positive	Rate
Fig. 4. The true-positive and false-positive rate of the test process with decision tree
classifier under different max depth.
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Table 11. Machine Learning Results of Infilteration Attack on Different Classification
Models.
Random Forest Naive Bayes Decision Tree Neural Network (MLP) Quadratic Discriminante KNeighbors
True-Positive 4% 11% 88% 0% 17% 28%
False-Positive 12% 10% 17% 17% 11% 16%
recall
Benigh 0.96 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.92
Infilteration 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.0 0.01 0.15
f1-score
Benigh 0.92 1.0 0.91 0.91 1.0 0.88
Infilteration 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.0 0.02 0.19
Table 12. Machine Learning Results of DOS-Hulk Attack on Different Classification
Models.
Random Forest Naive Bayes Decision Tree Neural Network (MLP) Quadratic Discriminante KNeighbors
True-Positive 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
False-Positive 15% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
recall
Benigh 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
DOS-Hulk 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.83 0.66 1.0
f1-score
Benigh 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.92 1.0 1.0
DOS-Hulk 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.91 1.0 1.0
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
2 3 4 5 6
Ti
m
e	
(se
co
nd
s)
Max	Depth
real user sys Poly.		(real)
Fig. 5. The time expenses of the test process with decision tree classifier under different
max depth, in terms of real, sys, and user time.
Table 13. Machine Learning Results of DoS-SlowHTTPTest Attack on Different Clas-
sification Models.
Random Forest Naive Bayes Decision Tree Neural Network (MLP) Quadratic Discriminante KNeighbors
True-Positive 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
False-Positive 15% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
recall
Benigh 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
DoS-SlowHTTPTest 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.66 1.0
f1-score
Benigh 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.92 1.0 1.0
DoS-SlowHTTPTest 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
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Table 14. Classification Results of the Benign and Intrusion Test Datasets on Decision
Tree Classification Model.
Results
Evil data only
precision
Benign 0.00%
Evil 100%
recall
Benign 0.00
Evil 0.40
f1-score
Benign 0.00
Evil 0.57
Benign data only
precision
Benign 100%
Evil 0.00%
recall
Benign 1.00
Evil 0.00
f1-score
Benign 1.00
Evil 0.00
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5 Conclusions
In this paper, we take an intensive analysis on intrusion detection using the flow-
based statistical data generated from network traffic packets with CICFlowMe-
ter, using machine learning classification models. Six common machine learning
classifications models are tested on the datasets generated from real-life attacks
and production networks. CIC-AWS-2018 Dataset which is collected by Amazon
cluster networks, containing benign traffic and fourteen different types of intru-
sions are used as training dataset, eight different types of intrusions traffic data
collected online and benign traffic data collected from our research production
network are used as testing dataset. Cross validations over the training dataset
are carried out on the six common machine learning classification models, one
model, decision tree classification, with the best performance on general adapt-
ability, precision, and time consumption, is chosen to carry out the testing ex-
periment. The testing results demonstrate acceptable performance for intrusion
detection, with 100% accuracy in detecting on Zero-Day intrusion or benign
data alone, and 96% accuracy in scrambled Zero-Day intrusion and benign
data, and false-positive rate of 5% at lowest.
Much is left to do in the future, for example, finding better models to fit the
statistical flow data, and testing on more novel types of intrusions in real time.
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